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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CALVIN LEE NIXON, 
Appellant/Petitioner, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee/Respondent. 
CaseNo.20071004-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Nixon appeals from the dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief in the 
Second Judicial District, Weber County, the Honorable Pamela G. Heffeman presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(f) 
(West 2008). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Did the post-conviction court correctly conclude that Nixon failed to demonstrate 
a meritorious claim or an acceptable reason for his untimely filing and therefore did not 
meet the "interests of justice" exception to the Post Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) 
time bar? 
Standard of Review. An appellate court "review[s] an appeal from an order 
dismissing or denying a petition for post-conviction relief for correctness without 
deference to the lower court's conclusions of law." Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53, [^ 9, 
165 P.3d 1195 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court "review[s] a lower court's 
purely factual findings for clear error, but review[s] the application of the law to the facts 
for correctness." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The texts of Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-104 through 107 (West 2004) and Rule 
65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, are attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Criminal proceedings. The State originally charged Nixon with attempted 
murder, a second degree felony. R54. Nixon was represented by two attorneys, Geoffrey 
L. Clark and Kristopher K. Greenwood. R57. Nixon pleaded guilty to aggravated 
assault, a second degree felony. R67. The court, however, agreed to allow Nixon "to 
withdraw his plea at the time of sentencing if the Court d[id] not agree with the 
recommendation from Adult Probation and Parole [AP&P]." R76; see also R71. Nixon 
moved to withdraw this plea, apparently because the trial court did not agree with 
AP&P's sentencing recommendation, and the trial court granted his motion. R79. 
On August 31, 2004, the State filed an amended information charging Nixon with 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony; Nixon pleaded guilty to the amended charge; 
and the trial court sentenced Nixon to a prison term of 0 to 5 years. R83, 86, 93-94. The 
court signed and filed the judgment on September 2, 2004. R94. Judge Pamela G. 
Heffernan conducted the criminal proceedings in the Second District Court, Weber 
County. R93-94. 
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Nixon did not file a motion to withdraw his plea and did not file a direct appeal. 
&>eR123. 
Proceedings on extraordinary writ. On May 16, 2006, Nixon's current counsel 
filed a petition in the Second District, Weber County, for a writ of coram nobis in the 
underlying criminal case, alleging that trial counsel, Geoffrey Clark, was ineffective. 
R96-103. The petition alleged that counsel had used drugs, failed to maintain contact 
with Nixon, failed to inform Nixon that he had a self-defense claim, and failed to raise 
the self-defense claim. Id. Judge Heffernan denied the writ on June 1,2006, advising 
Nixon that the appropriate procedure for his claims was the Post-Conviction Remedies 
Act. R106. On June 19,2006, the court denied Nixon's motion for reconsideration of 
this ruling. R109. 
Post-conviction proceedings. On July 13,2006, Nixon's current counsel filed a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus and a memorandum in support of that motion in the 
Third District Court. R8-16. Defendant again claimed that trial counsel was ineffective 
for the reasons alleged in his earlier coram nobis writ petition. Id. On September 20, 
2006, the Third District Court ordered the petition transferred to the Second District 
Court. R20, 22. The petition was assigned to the Second District Court and apparently 
received in Davis County on or before May 3, 2007. R24. It was then transferred to the 
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Second District Court, Weber County, and received by Judge Heffernan on May 25, 
2007.1 R24,27. 
The State moved to dismiss Nixon's petition as untimely. R31-35. Nixon did not 
deny that his petition was untimely, but argued in his response that his untimely filing 
should be excused in the "interests of justice." R143-48. On October 25,2007, the post-
conviction court, Judge Heffernan presiding, announced its decision to dismiss the 
petition and requested that the State prepare the appropriate order. Rl 62-69 (Ruling 
Granting State's Motion to Dismiss, attached as Addendum B). 
On November 21, 2007, before the order was prepared, signed, and entered, Nixon 
appealed. See R172. On July 14, 2008, the court of appeals temporarily remanded the 
case for entry of a final order. R189. 
On May 12, 2008, between Nixon's appeal and the temporary remand, the district 
court entered a final order. See Rl 79-88 (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order Dismissing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, attached as Addendum C). The 
district court ruled that the petition was untimely, but observed that a court may excuse 
an untimely filing in the "interests] of justice." R182. The court declined to excuse 
Nixon's untimely filing, however, concluding that Nixon's ineffectiveness claims lacked 
1
 Rule 65 C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires that the petition be filed with 
"the district court in the county in which the judgment of conviction was entered" and 
that it be assigned "to the judge who sentenced the petitioner." Utah R. Civ. P. 
65C(b)&(f). 
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merit and that he had provided no adequate explanation for his delay in filing his petition. 
R185-86. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
"Officers responded to a report of a family fight. The victim stated that [Nixon] 
tried to stab her with a knife. He also choked her during the altercation." R112. Nixon 
"stated under Miranda that a knife had been involved in the altercation." Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The post-conviction court correctly concluded that Nixon had not proffered 
evidence sufficient to establish that the "interests of justice" excused his failure to file his 
ineffective assistance claim within the statutory time limitations. 
To meet the "interests of justice" exception, a petitioner must be able to 
demonstrate that his claim is meritorious and that he had a good reason for filing his 
petition late. Nixon did not proffer facts to show that he had a meritorious claim. Nixon 
argued that trial counsel was ineffective for not presenting a self-defense claim, for not 
returning phone calls and visiting more often, for likely being "high on drugs" at the time 
of Nixon's decision to plead guilty and at the change-of-plea and sentencing hearing, for 
subsequently having been convicted of drug crimes, and for subsequently having had his 
bar license suspended. Nixon, however, did not show that he had given counsel any 
information that would have suggested the possibility of a self-defense claim. Moreover, 
Nixon did not show any deficient act or omission resulting from counsel's alleged failure 
to contact him, from counsel's alleged use of drugs, or from counsel's subsequent 
criminal convictions and bar discipline. Moreover, Nixon did not show prejudice—he 
5 
did not show that, but for counsel's alleged deficiencies, he would likely not have 
pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial. For all of the above reasons, 
Nixon did not demonstrate that he had a meritorious claim. 
In addition, Nixon did not offer reasons adequate to excuse his late filing. Nixon's 
cause of action accrued on October 2,2004. He therefore had until October 2, 2005 to 
file his petition. He did not file his petition for post-conviction relief until July 13, 2006, 
more than nine months too late. Nixon did not proffer facts to show that his late filing 
should be excused. While he asserted that he did not know he had any claims until he 
consulted with present counsel, he did not indicate when he actually did consult with 
counsel and learn about his potential claims. Nothing in the record suggests that his 
filing on July 13, 2006 was reasonable and that his late filing should therefore be 
excused. 
In sum, the post-conviction court properly concluded that Nixon had not 
demonstrated that his late filing should be excused in the "interests of justice." 
Nixon originally filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis on May 16, 2006. 
R96-103. However, even if his petition for post-conviction relief is counted from that 
date, the petition was still over seven months too late. 
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ARGUMENT 
NIXON DID NOT PROFFER EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO MEET 
HIS BURDEN TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HIS UNTIMELY 
FILING SHOULD BE EXCUSED IN THE "INTERESTS OF 
JUSTICE" 
The post-conviction court properly denied Nixon's petition for post-conviction 
relief.3 Nixon, who did not file within the PCRA time limitations, did not proffer 
evidence sufficient to show that his failure to timely file should be excused in the 
"interests of justice." 
Background. The post-conviction court treated Nixon's petition for writ of 
habeas corpus relief as a petition for post-conviction relief. The court noted that Nixon 
"d[id] not challenge that [his] petition [wa]s untimely, but rather submit[ted] that the 
petition me[t] the 'interests of justice' exception of the PCRA, which allows the Court to 
excuse an untimely filing 'if the court finds that the interests of justice require.'" R163 
(citing Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(3)). The court then ruled that Nixon had not met 
the requirements of the "interests of justice" exception to the statute of limitations. R168. 
3
 The State does not dispute the timeliness of Nixon's appeal. Nixon filed his 
notice of appeal after the trial court had announced its decision but before the trial court 
entered its final order. Under rule 4(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the appeal is 
"treated as filed after such entry and on the date thereof." 
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On appeal, Nixon challenges the court's determination that he failed to show that 
his untimely filing should be excused in the "interests of justice." See Br. Appellant at 
13-25.4 
Controlling law. In Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62,123 P.3d 400, the Utah 
Supreme Court set forth the matters relevant to the "interests of justice" exception to the 
PCRA statute of limitations: "An analysis of what constitutes an exception in the 
'interests of justice' should involve examination of both the meritoriousness of the 
petitioner's claim and the reason for an untimely filing." Id. at f^ 16. The court noted that 
it did "not establish as a hard and fast rule that a petitioner must be able to demonstrate 
both that his claim is meritorious and that he was justified in raising it late." Id. 
"[RJather," the court stated, "we expect that the district court will give appropriate weight 
to each of those factors according to the circumstances of a particular case." Id. "The 
petitioner bears the burden of pointing to sufficient factual evidence or legal authority to 
support a conclusion of meritoriousness." Id. at f 20. Likewise, a petitioner bears the 
burden to offer reasons adequate to "justiffy] his late filing." See Benvenuto v. State, 
2007 UT 53, f 34. 
4
 In Point I of his argument, Nixon states that "the trial court erred in granting 
[the] State's motion to dismiss [his] petition for post-conviction relief when finding said 
petition was untimely." Br. Appellant at 13. Review of the argument, however, shows 
that Nixon is addressing the post-conviction court's determination that his "explanation 
for untimely filing could be considered 'poor.'" Id. at 15. He does not argue that the 
petition was timely, but rather that the reasons for the untimely filing were adequate. See 
id. 
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A. Nixon did not proffer sufficient factual evidence or legal authority to support 
a conclusion that his claims are meritorious. 
In his post-conviction petition Nixon raised several ineffective assistance claims. 
He alleged that his counsel, Geoffrey Clark, (1) failed to talk to him "about a self defense 
claim," (2) failed to answer his phone and visited with Nixon only three times in six 
months, (3) was "high on drugs" at the time of Nixon's decision to plead and at the 
change of plea and sentencing, and (4) was later convicted on drug charges and had his 
bar license suspended. R4. 
To succeed on his post-conviction ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, Nixon 
had the burden of proving two elements. First, he had to establish constitutionally 
deficient performance. He had to prove that the specific acts or omissions by his counsel 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687-88, 690 (1984); Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994). He also had 
to overcome a strong presumption that trial counsel's performance fell within the "wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; see also State 
v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 1977); Parsons, 871 P.2d at 522. Whether trial 
counsel satisfied his duty to investigate Nixon's case "depend[ed] critically" upon the 
information Nixon supplied to him. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. 
Second, Nixon had to prove prejudice. As to his challenges to counsel's 
performance in the plea context, Nixon had to prove "a reasonable probability that but for 
counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to 
trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); accord State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, 
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f 17, 26 P.3d 203. This inquiry turned, in large part, on the likelihood that Nixon could 
have succeeded if he had gone to trial. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59-60. Nixon's mere 
assertion that he would not have pleaded guilty would not have been sufficient. "[M]ere 
allegation that he would have insisted on trial but for his trial counsel's errors, although 
necessary, is ultimately insufficient to entitle him to relief. Rather, [the court] look[s] to 
the factual circumstances surrounding the plea to determine whether [he] would have 
proceeded to trial." U.S. v. Clingman, 288 F.3d 1183, 1186 (10th Cir. 2002) (citation 
omitted). 
The post-conviction court properly ruled that Nixon had not presented a 
meritorious claim. None of his claims demonstrated "that his counsel's performance was 
deficient below an objective standard of reasonableness" or that he "was prejudiced by 
his counsel's performance." R168. 
1. Nixon did not demonstrate that trial counsel's performance was deficient. 
Nixon did not establish that trial counsel, Geoffrey Clark, was deficient for any of 
the reasons he alleged in his petition.5 
5
 Nixon was represented in his criminal case by two attorneys, Geoffrey Clark and 
Kristopher Greenwood. R57. Nixon did not argue in his petition for post-conviction 
relief that trial counsel, Kristopher Greenwood, was ineffective. The State therefore 
argued below that "[ejven assuming Mr. Clark's performance was deficient, [Nixon] 
[wa]s not entitled to post-conviction relief if he received effective assistance of counsel 
from Mr. Greenwood." R44. The trial court did not address this aspect of the State's 
argument in its ruling granting the State's motion to dismiss the petition for post-
conviction relief. See Rl 62-69. 
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Counsel's alleged failure to discuss with Nixon the possibility of a self-defense 
claim. Nixon did not demonstrate the counsel was deficient for not discussing with him 
the possibility of a self-defense claim. Nixon failed to assert that he presented counsel 
with any information that would have constituted a claim of self-defense. Nixon asserted 
only that he and his wife had "a history of violence." R146. He did not assert that his 
wife had ever been violent toward him. More significantly, he did not assert that she was 
violent toward him during the incident that led to his being charged with attempted 
murder or that he told counsel about any such violence. Because Nixon did not proffer 
evidence that he gave counsel information that could provide a factual basis for a self-
defense claim, he cannot show that counsel was deficient for not discussing with him and 
presenting a self-defense claim. "Counsel's actions are usually based, quite properly, 
on . . . information supplied by the defendant. In particular, what investigation decisions 
are reasonable depends critically on such information." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. 
Nixon did not show that he gave counsel any information that should have led 
counsel to discuss, investigate, or present a self-defense claim. Thus, he did not 
demonstrate that counsel was deficient for not presenting a self-defense claim. 
Counsel9s alleged failure to answer his phone and visit with Nixon more than 
three times in six months. Nixon alleged that trial counsel never answered his phone and 
only saw him three times. R97-101. How many times counsel did or did not answer his 
phone or meet with the petitioner does not, by itself, establish whether counsel was 
effective or not. "[A] court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the 
reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed 
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as of the time of counsel's conduct." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Nixon did not explain 
why counsel should have met with him more often. He did not proffer what information 
counsel might have obtained from Nixon that would have changed his defense or 
changed his decision to plead guilty. See State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 818 (Utah App. 
1994) (defendant's claim of inadequate investigation failed because defendant did not 
show what evidence would have been obtained upon further investigation). 
Thus, Nixon did not demonstrate that counsel was deficient for any alleged failure 
to answer the phone or to visit more frequently. 
Counsel's allegedly being "high on drugs" at the time of Nixon's decision to 
plead and at the change of plea and sentencing. In his affidavit in support of his 
petition, Nixon averred that he "found out after [his] sentencing that Geoffrey Clark was 
likely to be high on drugs at the time of [his] pleas and [his] sentencing," and opined that 
he therefore "could not rely on [Clark] for advice throughout the case." R15. The trial 
court ruled that Nixon's allegation did not establish deficient performance. R166. 
The court's ruling was proper. First, Nixon failed to assert or establish any 
specific facts to support his allegations. Even if Clark had been using drugs during the 
time that Nixon's case was pending, there was no evidence in the record to establish that 
Clark was actually using drugs or was high on drugs at the time of Nixon's decision to 
plead or at the time of his change of plea and sentencing hearing. No one—including the 
prosecutor, the trial judge, or co-counsel for Nixon—raised any issue concerning Clark's 
behavior or demeanor. The record contained no evidence that Clark was impaired in any 
way. As the post-conviction court ruled, Nixon "ma[de] no claims as to how his 
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counsel's supposed drug use affected his performance. He d[id] not even allege that his 
counsel acted strangely, or that he had any reason whatsoever to believe he might be on 
drugs." R166. 
Moreover, "under Strickland, the fact that an attorney used drugs is not, in and of 
itself, relevant to an ineffective assistance claim. The critical inquiry is whether, for 
whatever reason, counsel's performance was deficient and whether that deficiency 
prejudiced the defendant." Berry v. King, 765 F.2d 451,454 (5th Cir. 1985); see also 
State v. Coates, 786 P.2d 1182,1187 (Mont. 1990) ("absent any specific errors or 
conduct identified in the trial that affected the trial's outcome [defense counsel's] cocaine 
abuse is irrelevant to the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel"), overruled on other 
grounds by Porter v. State, 60 P.3d 951 (Mont. 2002). Other than his claim that Clark 
failed to present a self-defense claim, addressed above, Nixon did not allege any specific 
errors. He did not address any specific error that might have resulted from Clark's use of 
drugs and thus did not show deficient performance. 
Counsel's subsequent conviction on drug charges and the suspension of his bar 
license. Nixon claimed below that Clark had, at some point after sentencing, pleaded 
guilty to possession and attempted distribution of drugs and that he had had his bar 
license suspended. R4. As explained above, however, Nixon did not proffer any specific 
error that might have resulted from Clark's use of drugs or from his subsequent criminal 
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convictions and license suspension. Because he did not demonstrate any resulting error 
in the trial process, he did not demonstrate a deficiency.6 
2. Nixon did not demonstrate that he suffered any prejudice. 
The post-conviction court further ruled, "Not only has [Nixon] failed to show that 
his counsel's performance was deficient, but he has also failed to show that he was 
prejudiced by the performance." R167. The ruling was proper. Nixon did not 
demonstrate prejudice. He did not show that but for counsel's errors there was a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. 
As explained above, Nixon did not show that counsel was deficient for any of the 
reasons he alleged. Where Nixon did not demonstrate a deficiency, he also could not 
have demonstrated prejudice as a result of a deficiency. He could not have shown that 
absent the deficiency, there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome. 
Moreover, in this case, Nixon pleaded guilty. As explained above, where a 
conviction results from a guilty plea, to demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner must show "a 
reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and 
would have insisted on going to trial." Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. 
Moreover, the fact that Clark's bar license was suspended is not sufficient, by 
itself, to establish that Clark provided ineffective assistance of counsel. "Under the 
Strickland standard, breach of an ethical standard does not necessarily make out a denial 
of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel." Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 
157, 165 (1986). 
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To determine whether a petitioner would not have pleaded guilty, an appellate 
court will look at the factual circumstances surrounding the plea. Clingman, 288 F.3d at 
1186. The inquiry turns, in large part, on the likelihood that the petitioner would have 
succeeded if he had gone to trial. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59-60. 
Here, as the court also stated, "[Nixon] was originally charged with attempted 
murder. But as the result of his plea, he was only convicted of aggravated assault, a 
third-degree felony." Rl67-68. Thus, he received favorable treatment for his plea 
agreement. 
Moreover, nothing in the record suggests a likelihood that Nixon would have-
succeeded, had he gone to trial. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59-60. As explained, Nixon did 
not show that he had a viable self-defense claim that could likely have motivated him to 
go to trial. Moreover, in the words of the post-conviction court, he offered no other 
"justifiable reason in his petition or memoranda for him to have gone to trial on the 
attempted murder charge, rather than plead guilty to the third-degree felony." R168. 
Under these circumstances, Nixon did not show a probability that, but for some 
deficient conduct, he would not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on going to 
trial. Thus, he did not demonstrate any prejudice. 
B. Nixon did not offer reasons adequate to justify his late filing. 
The trial court entered judgment in Nixon's criminal case on September 2,2004. 
R94. Nixon had thirty days, or until October 2, 2004, within which to file an appeal. See 
Utah R. App. P. 4(a). He did not file an appeal. See R123. He therefore had one year, or 
until October 2, 2005, within which to file a petition for post-conviction relief. See Utah 
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Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(l) and (2)(a). Nixon did not file his petition until July 13,2006, 
more than nine months after the PCRA time limit had expired, when he filed it in the 
wrong district. See R3. Even Nixon's erroneous filing of a writ of error coram nobis, 
his first post-conviction filing, did not occur until May 16, 2006, more than seven months 
after the PCRA time limit had expired. See R96-103. 
Nixon claimed in his petition that counsel did not tell him that he "had a defense 
of self-defense to the aggravated assault charge" and that he "did not become aware of 
the availability of the defense until more than 30 days after [he] had made a plea bargain 
and was sentenced." R15. He also claimed that he "found out after [his] sentencing that 
Geoffrey Clark was likely to [have been] high on drugs at the time of [his] pleas and [his] 
sentencing." Id. Nixon did not, however, indicate when he became aware of these 
matters. He did not indicate that he did not learn of these matters in time to file a timely 
post-conviction petition. Nixon proffered evidence to demonstrate that he did not know 
of these matters "until more than 30 days after [he] had made a plea bargain and was 
sentenced," i.e., during the 30-day period during which he could have filed a timely 
appeal. R15. He did not, however, assert that he did not learn about them during the 
period when he could have filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. He asserted 
As noted, the petition did not arrive in the Second District and was not received 
by Judge Heffernan until May 25, 2007, more than 19 months late. 
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that he did not know about these matters until he consulted with current counsel, but he 
did not indicate when, in fact, consultation with current counsel occurred. See R147. 
Nixon therefore failed to indicate when he first learned of the availability of a self-
defense claim or whether it was before or after the PCRA statute of limitations had 
expired. Moreover, even assuming he did not learn about the claim until after the statute 
of limitations had expired, he did not proffer evidence demonstrating that the filing of his 
post-conviction petition followed within a reasonable period of time. Thus, the trial court 
properly concluded that Nixon had not met his burden to proffer an adequate reason for 
his untimely filing under the PCRA. See R186. 
In sum, the trial court properly determined that Nixon's claims lacked merit, that 
his explanation for his untimely filing was inadequate, and therefore that his late filing 
could not be excused in the "interests of justice." Id. at 185-86. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the 
appellate court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 
2005 UT 18, f 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the 
litigant and the bench." Moles v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 654 P.2d 740, 743 (Cal. 1982). 
In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by oral argument." 
Utah R.App. P. 29(a)(3). 
17 
CONCLUSION 
The post-conviction court correctly held that Nixon had not met his burden to 
show that his failure to timely file his petition should be excused in the "interests of 
justice." He did not demonstrate, as required, that his claims were meritorious or that he 
had an adequate reason for his failure to timely file his petition. For these reasons, the 
post-conviction court properly granted the State's motion to dismiss Nixon's petition for 
post-conviction relief. The court's decision should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this W day of (jtUlv/ , 2008. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
jXfrU/^ 
f
 JEANNE B.INO 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART IV. PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS 
CHAPTER 35A. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT 
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
§ 78-35a-104. Grounds for relief—Retroactivity of rule 
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78-35a-106 or 78-353-107, a person who has been 
convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the district 
court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or modify the 
conviction or sentence upon the following grounds: 
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of the 
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; 
(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is in violation of the United 
States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which the petitioner 
was prosecuted is constitutionally protected; 
(c) the sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner, or probation was revoked in an 
unlawful manner; 
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the 
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; or 
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to vacate 
the conviction or sentence, because: 
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the 
time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously 
filed post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could 
not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence; 
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known; 
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and 
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material evidence 
demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner 
guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence received. 
(2) The question of whether a petitioner is entitled to the benefit of a rule 
announced by the United States Supreme Court, Utah Supreme Court, or Utah Court of 
Appeals after the petitioner's conviction became final shall be governed by 
applicable state and federal principles of retroactivity. 
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CHAPTER 35A. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT 
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
§ 78-35a-105. Burden of proof 
The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief. The respondent 
has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion under Section 78-35a-106, but 
once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the burden to disprove its 
existence by a preponderance of the evidence. 
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1. In general 
Writ of coram nobis, like one of habeas corpus, is civil in nature and applicant 
has burden of showing that there is evidence he could not have known about at the 
time of trial which would afford him relief; applicant must show that an error was 
made and that he had no way of knowing about it and, further, that if he had known 
about it, there would not have been a conviction in the case. State v. Mitchell, 
1977, 569 P.2d 1117. Criminal Law ^-^ 1409; Criminal Law ^-^ 1613 
2^. Constitutional rights 
Placement of burden of proving that withdrawal of direct appeal was not knowing and 
voluntary on petitioner for postconviction relief did not violate due process, 
where appeal was filed and proceeded routinely until petitioner personally 
requested that it be withdrawn. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; Const. Art. 1, §§ 7, 12; 
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§ 78-35a-106. Preclusion of relief—Exception 
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that: 
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion; 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal; 
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or 
could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction 
relief; or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a 
basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if 
the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
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§ 78-35a-107. Statute of limitations for postconviction relief 
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one 
year after the cause of action has accrued. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the 
following dates: 
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of 
conviction, if no appeal is taken; 
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over 
the case, if an appeal is taken; 
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme 
Court or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari is 
filed; 
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of 
the decision on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of 
certiorari is filed; or 
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based. 
(3) If the court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may excuse a 
petitioner's failure to file within the time limitations. 
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,1. Validity of prior law 
Three-judge panel that held three-month statute of limitations for habeas corpus 
petitions unconstitutional did so pursuant to "judicial power of the state" and 
holding thus had binding effect of stare decisis on other panels of Court of 
Appeals; to hold otherwise would be to disregard nature of Court of Appeals1 
jurisdiction, manner in which it must act, and necessity for uniformity and 
predictability in law established by panels of Court of Appeals. Const. Art. 8, § 
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Statute of limitations governing writ of habeas corpus merited review under open 
courts provision of state constitution, in light of nature of habeas relief as 
basic individual right, and in light of nature of prisoners as group that needed 
protection due to their isolation in society and lack of political influence. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-12-31.1; Const. Art. 1, § 11. Currier v. Holden, 1993, 862 P.2d 
1357, certiorari denied 870 P. 2d 957. Constitutional Law ^-^ 328; Limitation €=> 
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Inflexible three-month statute of limitations governing habeas relief without any 
exception for excusable delay was unreasonable and, thus, unconstitutional under 
open courts provision of state constitution; prisoners' interests in protecting 
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Supreme Court of Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those courts. 
Advisory Committee Notes 
Addendum B 
Addendum B 
IN THE SECOND J U D I C l ^ ^ 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
t \ 3 7 M C T CUURT 
CALVIN LEE NIXON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH,
 0 C T 2 5 2002 
Respondent. 
RULING GRANTING 
STATE'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS PETITION FOR 
POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF 
Case No. 070903073 
Judge Pamela G. Heffernan 
Petitioner Calvin Lee Nixon filed a petition for post-conviction relief on May 11, 
2007, under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA), Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 
et seq. Respondent State of Utah moved to dismiss the petition pursuant to rules 12(b)(6) 
and 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner then filed a response to the 
motion, and Respondent filed a reply. After considering the petition and the memoranda 
filed by both parties, the Court grants the State's motion to dismiss the petition. 
In his petition for relief, Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to a new trial based 
on the ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner claims that his counsel, Geoffrey 
Clark, failed to discuss the possibility of a self-defense claim with his client, never 
answered his phone, and only met with Petitioner three times. Further, Petitioner claims 
his counsel "was likely to be high on drugs at the time of Petitioner's plea and 
settlement." Memorandum in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, p. 4. 
I. The "Interests of Justice" Exception 
The State argues that the petition should be dismissed because it is untimely. 
Petitioner was originally charged with one count of attempted murder in an incident 
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involving his former wife, but later pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault, a third-
degree felony. He was sentenced on September 2, 2004, to 0 to 5 years in the Utah State 
Prison, but did not file his petition for post-conviction relief until May 11,2007. The 
PCRA states that a petition must be "filed within one year after the cause of action has 
accrued." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(l). Petitioner does not challenge that the 
petition is untimely, but rather submits that the petition meets the "interests of justice" 
exception of the PCRA, which allows the Court to excuse an untimely filing "[i]f the 
court finds that the interests of justice require." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a-107(3). 
hi Adams v. State, 123 P.3d 400 (Utah 2005), the Utah Supreme Court analyzed 
the "interests of justice" exception, declaring that it: 
[S]hould involve examination of both the meritoriousness of the petitioner's claim 
and the reason for an untimely filing. We do not establish as a hard and fast rule 
that a petitioner must be able to demonstrate both that his claim is meritorious and 
that he was justified in raising it late; rather we expect that the district court will 
give appropriate weight to each of those factors according to the circumstances of 
a particular case. 
Id. at 404. In analyzing these two factors, "the court should rely not only on the 
petitioner's memorandum in opposition but also on the initial petition itself in evaluating 
the two factors we have identified" Id. If a petitioner's claims fail to meet the interests 
of justice standard as set out in Adams, an untimely petition may rightly be dismissed. 
See id. at 401,405. 
A. Reason for Untimely Filing 
With these points in mind, the Court will first examine Petitioner's reason for the 
untimely filing. Petitioner's sole explanation for filing his petition more than 32 months 
after his sentencing is limited to his assertion that he "did not become aware of the 
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availability of a self-defense claim until consulting with his current counsel." Response 
to State's Motion to Dismiss..., p. 5. 
While the Court accepts that this explanation with regards to the self-defense 
claim is a plausible reason for delay, it should be noted that Petitioner raised the very 
same claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in his Petition for Writ of Coram Nobis 
filed on May 16,2006, almost one year prior to his May 11,2007, petition for post-
conviction relief. Additionally, this Court denied the Petition for Writ of Coram Nobis 
on May 30,2006, on the grounds that the appropriate procedure for claims such as 
Petitioner's was post-conviction relief; yet Petitioner does not explain the 11-month delay 
from that date in filing his petition. Furthermore, Petitioner provides no explanation as to 
why he did not previously raise his claims regarding his counsel's alleged drug use and 
supposed failure to attend to his client. 
At best, Petitioner's explanation for the untimely filing could be considered 
"poor." Nevertheless, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that a conclusively meritorious 
claim "may require virtually no justification for a late filing." Adams, 123 P.3d at 404. 
Therefore, the Court grants Petitioner the benefit of the doubt and considers the 
meritoriousness of his claims. 
B. Meritoriousness of Petitioner's Claims 
In examining claims under the "interests of justice" exception, the Court "must go 
one step further" than whether a claim is non-frivolous "and examine whether the claim 
is meritorious. The petitioner bears the burden of pointing to sufficient factual evidence 
or legal authority to support a conclusion of meritoriousness." Id. at 405. Ultimately, in 
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this case, it is the Petitioner's utter lack of factual evidence to support his claims which 
dooms his petition. 
Petitioner's plea for relief is based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Under 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), ineffective assistance claims must pass a 
two-prong test: (1) counsers performance must be deficient below an objective standard 
of reasonableness, and (2) counsel's deficient performance must prejudice his client. Id. 
at 687. Therefore, the Court will examine these two prongs in order to determine if 
Petitioner's claims are meritorious. 
1. Deficient Performance 
a. Failure to Raise Self-defense Claim 
Petitioner alleges that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his 
attorney failed to discuss with him the possibility of a self-defense claim. Under 
Strickland, there is a strong presumption that counsel performed adequately. Id. at 690. 
In order for Petitioner to overcome this presumption, he must allege facts which show 
that he may have had a valid self-defense claim, and that his attorney failed to recognize 
that claim from the stated facts. However, Petitioner fails to allege any facts which 
would suggest he was entitled to a claim of self-defense. In fact, Petitioner does not even 
allege that he did act in self-defense; he merely states that his attorney did not discuss a 
self-defense claim with him. 
Petitioner's only attempt at providing factual support for a possible self-defense 
claim comes in his statement that 'Tetitioner and his former wife have a history of 
violence, but the Petitioner was never apprised of the possibility of exerting the defense 
of self-defense on the attempted murder charge by his former counsel." Response to 
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State's Motion to Dismiss..., p. 4. Petitioner gives no details of this "history of violence" 
and does not allege that his former wife had ever been violent towards him. More 
importantly, he does not allege that she was violent towards him during the incident 
which led to him being charged with attempted murder. Without providing some sort of 
factual basis for a self-defense claim, Petitioner cannot show that his counsel was 
deficient in not raising such a claim. 
b. Drug Use 
Petitioner also alleges that his attorney was "likely to be high on drugs" at the 
time of his plea and sentencing. This allegation appears to be mere speculation based on 
the fact that Petitioner's former counsel was later convicted of drug charges and had his 
bar license suspended. Petitioner fails to allege any specific facts which would show that 
his attorney was on drugs at the time of his plea or sentencing. 
Further, even if Petitioner could show that his attorney was on drugs, drug use by 
itself is irrelevant to a claim of ineffective assistance. See Berry v. King, 765 F.2d 451, 
454 (5th Cir. 1985); State v. Coates, 786 P.2d 1182,1186 (Mont. 1990). "The critical 
inquiry is whether, for whatever reason, counsel's performance was deficient and 
whether that deficiency prejudiced the defendant." Berry, 765 F.2d at 454. Petitioner 
makes no claims as to how his counsel's supposed drug use affected his performance. He 
does not even allege that his counsel acted strangely, or that he had any reason 
whatsoever to believe he might be on drugs. As such, Petitioner's bald allegation is 
insufficient to show that his counsel's performance was deficient. 
c. Other factors 
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Petitioner also asserts that his attorney did not take his phone calls and only met 
with him three times in six months. These allegations provide no insight into the 
effectiveness of counsel's representation of the Petitioner. Therefore, Petitioner has 
failed to carry his burden of showing that his counsel's performance was deficient. 
2. Prejudice to Client 
Not only has Petitioner failed to show that his counsel's performance was 
deficient, but he has also failed to show that he was prejudiced by the performance. In 
order to show prejudice, Petitioner must show that there would be a reasonable likelihood 
of a more favorable outcome absent counsel's deficient performance. Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 695. 
Petitioner has argued that he was prejudiced because his attorney never discussed 
with him the possibility of a self-defense claim. While the outcome may have been more 
favorable for Petitioner if he had a valid self-defense claim, Petitioner makes no 
assertions and provides no facts which would support such a claim. Without facts on 
which to determine the possible validity of the self-defense claim, the Court cannot find 
that Petitioner may have been prejudiced by the failure to raise the claim. 
Additionally, Petitioner argues that he was prejudiced by his attorney's alleged 
drug use during the plea and sentencing. But Petitioner does not specify how his 
counsel's drug use affected his performance or prejudiced the outcome of his case. 
Therefore, the Petitioner cannot show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's alleged 
drug use. 
Finally, the Court also notes that Petitioner was originally charged with attempted 
murder. But as the result of his plea, he was only convicted of aggravated assault, a 
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third-degree felony. Petitioner has provided no justifiable reason in his petition or 
memoranda for him to have gone to trial on the attempted murder charge, rather than 
plead guilty to the third-degree felony. He clearly received a benefit in the form of a 
lighter sentence by pleading guilty to the reduced charge than he would have if convicted 
of attempted murder. Petitioner has failed to show any prejudice resulting from his 
counsel's performance. 
Conclusion 
Petitioner has not alleged sufficient facts in support of his claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel which would prevent the dismissal of the petition. From his claims 
stated, he cannot show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's performance, nor can he 
show that his counsel's performance was deficient below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. As such, he cannot meet the two-prong test of Strickland. Petitioner's 
claims lack merit under the standard described in Adams. Further, Petitioner has 
provided an inadequate explanation for his delay in filing. The petition for post-
conviction relief does not meet the "interests of justice" exception, and is therefore 
untimely under the PCRA. 
Accordingly, the Court grants the State's Motion to Dismiss Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief. Ms. Riley will please prepare the approp; 
Dated this _^^ay"of October, 2007. 
Pamela G. Heftema^^ge 
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FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
Case No. 070903073 
Judge Pamela G. Heffernan 
This matter came before the Court on the State's motion to dismiss the petition for 
post-conviction relief. The Court has reviewed the petition and supporting memorandum. It 
has also reviewed the State's motion to dismiss and the memoranda supporting and opposing 
the motion. Now being folly advised in the premises, the Court makes the following 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and enters the following order granting the State's 
motion and dismissing the petition as untimely. 
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070903073 STATE OF UTAH 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner was originally charged with one count of attempted murder, a second degree 
felony. 
2. A second amended information was filed, and petitioner pled guilty to one count of 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony. 
3. On September 2, 2004, petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 0 to 5 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
4. Petitioner did not file any motion to withdraw his plea and did not file any direct 
appeal. 
5. On May 16, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and petition for 
writ of coram nobis in the underlying criminal case. 
6. On June 1, 2006, the Court denied the petitions, advising petitioner that the 
appropriate procedure for the claims was under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. 
7. On June 19, 2006, a motion for reconsideration was denied. 
8. Petitioner did not file current petition for post-conviction relief until May 11, 2007. 
9. Petitioner asserted that he was entitled to a new trial based on ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Petitioner claimed that his counsel, Geof&ey Clark, failed to discuss the possibility 
of a self-defense claim with him, never answered his phone, and only met with him three 
2 
times. Further, petitioner claimed that his counsel "was likely to be high on drugs at the time 
of Petitioner's plea and settlement" (Memo, in support of petition, p. 4). 
10. The State responded to the petition with a motion to dismiss, arguing that the petition 
should be dismissed because it was untimely under Utah Code section 78-35a-107 of the 
Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA), because it was filed more than a year after the 
accrual of petitioner's cause of action, and because it did not meet the interests of justice 
exception. 
11. Petitioner did not challenge the fact that the petition was untimely, but asserted that 
the petition met the "interests of justice" exception. 
12. Petitioner's sole explanation for filing his petition more than 32 months after his 
sentencing was limited to his assertion that he "did not become aware of the availability of a 
self-defense claim until consulting with his current counsel." (Resp. to State's Motion to 
Dismiss . . . , p. 5). 
13. Petitioner did not explain the 11-month delay from the date his petition for writ of 
coram nobis was denied until he filed his current petition for post-conviction relief. 
14. Petitioner also provided no explanation as to why he did not previously raise his 
claims regarding his counsel's alleged drug use and supposed failure to attend to his client 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Petitioner was required to file his petition '"within one year after [his] cause of action 
ha[d] accrued." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-107(l) (2002). 
2. Because petitioner did not file an appeal, his cause of action accrued on "the last day 
for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of conviction." Utah Code Ann. § 
78-35a-107(2)(a). 
3. Petitioner was sentenced on September 2,2004. The last day petitioner could have 
filed a notice of appeal was October 2, 2004. The one-year time limit therefore ran out on 
October 2,2005. 
4. Petitioner did not file his current petition until May 11,2007. The petition was 
therefore untimely. 
5. Section 78-35a-107(3) provides an exception to the statute of limitations. It states that 
"[i]f the court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may excuse a petitioner's 
failure to file within the time limitations." Id. 
6. The Utah Supreme Court analyzed the "interest of justice" exception in Adams v. 
State, 2005 UT 62,123 P.3d 400 (Utah 2005), declaring that it "should involve examination 
of both the meritoriousness of the petitioner's claim and the reason for the untimely filing." 
Id. At 404. 
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7. "The petitioner bears the burden of pointing to sufficient factual evidence or legal 
authority to support a conclusion of meritoriousness." Adams, 123 P.3d at 404. 
8. Petitioner's plea for relief is based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Under 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), ineffective assistance claims must pass a 
two-prong-test: (1) counsel's performance must be deficient below an objective standard of 
reasonableness, and (2) counsel's deficient performance must prejudice his client. Id. 
9. Petitioner's utter lack of factual evidence to support his claims dooms his petition. 
Petitioner fails to allege any facts which would suggest he was entitled to a claim of self-
defense. In fact, petitioner does not even allege that he did act in self-defense; he merely 
states that his attorney did not discuss a self-defense claim with him. Petitioner's only 
attempt at providing factual support for a possible self-defense claim comes in his statement 
that cTetitioner and his former wife have a history of violence." Petitioner gives no details 
of this "history of violence." He does not allege that his former wife had ever been violent 
towards him, and more importantly, does not allege that she was violent towards him during 
the incident which led to him being charged with attempted murder. Without providing 
some sort of factual basis for a self-defense claim, Petitioner cannot show that his counsel 
was deficient in not raising such a claim. 
10. Petitioner also alleges that his attorney was "likely to be high on drugs" at the time of 
his plea and sentencing. This allegation appears to be mere speculation based on the fact that 
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Petitioner's former counsel was later convicted of drug charges and had his bar license 
suspended. Petitioner fails to allege any specific facts which would show that his attorney 
was on drugs at the time of his plea or sentencing. 
11. Even if Petitioner could show that his attorney was on drugs, drug use by itself is 
irrelevant to a claim of ineffective assistance. See Berry v. King, 765 F.2d 451,454 (5th Cir. 
1985); State v. Coates, 786 P.2d 1182,1186 (Mont. 1990). "The critical inquiry is whether, 
for whatever reason, counsers performance was deficient and whether that deficiency 
prejudiced the defendant." Berry, 765 F.2d at 454. 
12. Petitioner makes no claims as to how his counsel's supposed drug use affected his 
performance. He does not allege that his counsel acted strangely, or that he had any reason 
whatsoever to believe he might be on drugs. As such, Petitioner's bald allegation is 
insufficient to show that his counsel's performance was deficient. 
13. Petitioner also alleges that his attorney did not take his phone calls and only met with 
him three times in six months. These allegations provide no insight into the effectiveness of 
counsel's representation. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of showing that 
his counsel's performance was deficient 
14. Not only has Petitioner failed to show tihat his counsel's performance was deficient, 
but he has also failed to show that he was prejudiced by the performance. 
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15. In order to show prejudice, Petitioner must show that there would be a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome absent counsel's deficient performance. Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 695. 
16. Without facts on which to determine the possible validity of a self-defense claim, the 
Court cannot find that Petitioner may have been prejudiced by the failure to raise the claim. 
17. Petitioner argued that he was prejudiced by his attorney's alleged drug use, but did 
not specify how his counsel's drug use affected his performance or prejudiced the outcome 
of his case. Therefore, Petitioner cannot show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's 
alleged drug use. 
18. Petitioner was originally charged with attempted murder, but as the result of his plea, 
was only convicted of aggravated assault, a third-degree felony. Petitioner provided no 
justifiable reason for him to have gone to trial on the attempted murder charge, rather than 
plead guilty to the third-degree felony. He clearly received a benefit in the form of a lighter 
sentence by pleading guilty to the reduced charge, than he would have if convicted of 
attempted murder. 
19. Petitioner failed to show that his counsel's performance was deficient. He also failed 
to show any prejudice resulting from his counsel's performance. Therefore he cannot meet 
the two-prong test of Strickland. 
20. Petitioner's claims lack merit under the standard described in Adams. 
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21. Furthermore, Petitioner provided an inadequate explanation for his delay in filing his 
petition. 
22. The petition for post-conviction relief does not meet the "interests of justice" 
exception, and is therefore untimely under the PCRA. 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court enters the 
following: 
ORDER 
1. The State's motion to dismiss is GRANTED. 
2. The petition for post-conviction relief is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
DATED this day of November, 2007. MAY 0 9 2008 
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